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Analytical General Equilibrium Effects of
Energy Policy on Output and Factor Prices∗
Don Fullerton and Garth Heutel
Abstract
Using an analytical general equilibrium model, we find solutions for the effect of energy pol-
icy on factor prices as well as output prices. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, and we
consider a tax on carbon dioxide. By looking at expenditure and income patterns across household
groups, we quantify the uses-side and sources-side incidence of the tax. When households are
categorized either by annual income or by total annual consumption as a proxy for permanent in-
come, the uses-side incidence is regressive. This result is robust to sensitivity analysis over various
parameter values. The sources-side incidence can be progressive, U-shaped, or regressive. Results
on the sources side are sensitive to parameter values.
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Energy is an integral input to nearly all aspects of economic life.  Energy 
policies, especially policies aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with energy consumption, thus have sizable effects on nearly all participants in 
our economy.  The distribution of these effects, both costs and benefits, across 
participants is an important consideration of policy design. 
 The incidence of the costs of energy or climate policy manifests itself in at 
least two major ways.  First, policy affects the “uses side” of income, through 
product prices.  A carbon tax may disproportionately increase the price of 
gasoline and electricity, two goods that represent a higher share of expenditure for 
poorer households.  The uses side incidence is then regressive.  Second, policy 
affects the “sources side” of income, through factor prices.  A carbon tax may be 
more burdensome to capital-intensive industries and disproportionately reduce the 
return to capital.  If so, and if capital provides a higher share of income for richer 
households, then the sources side incidence may be progressive. 
 Many studies of the distributional impacts of energy policy focus on the 
uses side only, through a partial equilibrium approach.  The purpose of this paper 
is to analyze both the uses side and the sources side incidence of domestic climate 
policy using an analytical general equilibrium model, highlighting conceptual 
issues by showing the general effects of each parameter on each result.1
 Our model is based on the standard Harberger (1962) tax incidence model, 
with two factors of production (labor and capital) and two sectors of production (a 
“dirty” or polluting sector, and a “clean” sector).  We add pollution, modeled as a 
third input to production in the dirty sector.  In earlier papers, we show 
analytically how output prices and the returns to capital and labor are affected by 
changes in several types of pollution policy, including a pollution tax, tradable 
permits, performance standards, or technology mandates. 
   
 In this paper, we quantify those analytical results numerically.  We 
calibrate the model to the US economy, and we distinguish households using 
expenditure and income data from the 2008 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX), supplemented by capital income data from the 2007 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF).  We then consider effects of carbon policy.  We solve for the 
impacts on the prices of carbon-intensive goods relative to clean goods, and on 
the wage and the capital rental rate.  We then apply these price changes to the 
households in our data to calculate the burdens across income groups and regions.  
In this paper, we find distributional effects on the uses side (commodity price 
changes) and sources side (factor price changes).  We do not calculate effects 
through the use of the revenues by government, either for rebates to households or 
for the indexing of government transfers (as in Rausch et al. 2010).  
                                                          
1 Besides these two effects, Fullerton (2009) lists and discusses four other distributional effects of 
environmental policy not considered here: (3) scarcity rents, (4) transition effects, (5) land or stock 
price capitalization, and (6) distribution of the benefits of environmental protection. 
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 When families are categorized either by annual income or by total annual 
consumption, the uses-side incidence of a carbon tax is regressive.  Lower-income 
households spend a higher fraction of their expenditures on carbon-intensive 
goods than do higher-income households.  This result is robust and corroborates 
many other papers (Burtraw, et al., 2009, or Hassett, et al., 2009).  When 
categorized by region, the uses-side incidence is again robust; regions that spend 
more than average on carbon-intensive goods bear a disproportionately high 
burden (especially the Midwest and the South).     
On the sources side, however, incidence results are sensitive to chosen 
parameter values.  In particular, the regressivity or progressivity on the sources 
side depends on the elasticities of substitution in production for polluting 
industries.  These elasticities have not been estimated, and thus we present 
incidence calculations for several alternative values.  A partial equilibrium 
analysis that focuses only on output prices might understate or overstate the extent 
to which carbon policy is regressive, by neglecting general equilibrium effects on 
factor prices.   
 A disadvantage of our methodology lies in its aggregation to only two 
sectors and two or three factors of production.  A more disaggregated model could 
be more realistic and could be used to calculate more specific effects on prices of 
each different good and factor.  However, more disaggregation and other features 
would require a numerical solution.  For us, the aggregation and other 
simplifications provide the advantage that we can derive analytical solutions for 
general equilibrium effects on both output and factor prices that hold for any 
parameters in the model, not just for particular numerical implementations.  Our 
model can be interpreted as a complement to a more detailed computational 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, to examine more closely what drives certain 
results.  As a referee put it, we provide a “model of the model.” 
 In a special case where the two sectors have the same factor intensity and 
the same substitution parameters, we show that carbon pricing has no effect on the 
wage-rental ratio.  If so, then analysts could focus on product prices alone.  With 
other values for these unknown parameters, however, changes in the wage/rental 
ratio can offset or exacerbate regressivity on the uses side.  We conclude that 
these production parameters need to be estimated, before these effects on the 
sources side can be dismissed.  
 The next section presents the model and analytic solutions.  Section 2 
describes the calibration, and section 3 presents the simulation results. 
I. Model 
This model is based on an earlier one from Fullerton and Heutel (2007), which 
itself is an extension of Harberger (1962).  The model is solved by log-linearizing 
2
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about the initial equilibrium, so it is valid for small changes in the tax rate.  We 
briefly summarize the model here. 
 The economy consists of two sectors producing two different final goods.  
One sector,  X,  uses only capital  KX  and labor  LX  as inputs; it is labeled the 
clean sector.  The dirty sector,  Y,  uses both capital and labor  (KY  and  LY)  and a 
third input, pollution  (Z).  Production functions have constant returns to scale: 
X = X(KX, LX) 
Y = Y(KY, LY, Z). 
Total capital and labor resources are fixed:  
KX + KY = 𝐾, 
LX + LY = 𝐿. 
By totally differentiating these two constraints, we get: 
 𝐾�𝑋λKX + 𝐾�𝑌λKY = 0,              (1) 
 𝐿�𝑋λLX + 𝐿�𝑌λLY = 0,              (2) 
where variables with a hat denote a proportional change (e.g. 𝐾�𝑋 = dKX/KX),  and 
where  λij  denotes sector  j’s  share of factor  i  (e.g.  λKX = KX/𝐾).   
 Producers of the clean good  X  face a rental price for capital (r) and a 
wage price for labor  (w).  Their factor demand choices are defined by their 
elasticity of substitution in production,  σX:  
 𝐾�𝑋 – 𝐿�𝑋 = σX(𝑤�  – ?̂?).              (3) 
Producers of the dirty good  Y  face prices for all three of their inputs, including a 
tax or other price on emissions  τZ .  Their factor demand choices can be defined 
in terms of Allen elasticities of substitution between their inputs, eij , and revenue 
shares of inputs (e.g., θYK = rKY/pYY).  These relationships follow Mieszkowski 
(1972) and Allen (1938): 
 𝐾�𝑌 – ?̂? = θYK(eKK – eZK) ?̂? + θYL(eKL – eZL) 𝑤�  + θYZ(eKZ – eZZ) ?̂?𝑍,               (4) 
           𝐿�𝑌 – ?̂? = θYK(eLK – eZK) ?̂? + θYL(eLL – eZL) 𝑤�  + θYZ(eLZ – eZZ) ?̂?𝑍.                (5) 
 We assume perfect competition and constant returns to scale in 
production.2
?̂?𝑋 + 𝑋� = θXK(?̂? + 𝐾�𝑋) + θXL(𝑤�  + 𝐿�𝑋),                                                        (6) 
  These yield zero profit conditions that can be differentiated to get: 
?̂?𝑌 + 𝑌�  = θYK(?̂? + 𝐾�𝑌) + θYL(𝑤�  + 𝐿�𝑌) + θYZ(?̂? + ?̂?𝑍).                                  (7) 
                                                          
2 These assumptions may be questionable, especially for a dirty industry that is composed in large 
part by regulated electric utilities.  For example, an emissions tax may not fully be passed through 
to ratepayers if it reduces infra-marginal rents on base-load generating units.  In the conclusion, 
we mention some extensions to the model that could incorporate these concerns.  
3
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 Totally differentiating each sector’s production function and using the 
assumption of perfect competition yields: 
 𝑋� = θXK𝐾�𝑋 + θXL𝐿�𝑋,                                                                                  (8) 
 𝑌�  = θYK𝐾�𝑌 + θYL𝐿�𝑌 + θYZ?̂?.                                                                       (9) 
 Lastly, we model consumer preferences for the two goods with the 
elasticity of substitution in utility,  σu: 
 𝑋� – 𝑌�  = σu(?̂?𝑌 – ?̂?𝑋).                                                                              (10) 
 These ten equations constitute the model.  Because the model has eleven 
unknowns, we choose good  X  as numeraire, setting  ?̂?𝑋 = 0.  Then, the linearized 
system of equations can be solved to consider how a small exogenous change in 
the pollution tax  τZ  affects factor prices  w  and  r  and output prices, given by  
pY.  The choice of normalization means that all price changes are relative to the 
price of  X.  Thus, if  ?̂?𝑌 > 0,  the price of good  Y  increases relative to the price of 
good  X,  so consumers who spend more than average on good  Y  are burdened 
relatively more than are other consumers on the uses side.  Furthermore, the 
normalization implies that  𝑤�   and  ?̂?  are always of opposite sign (subtract 
equation (8) from equation (6)).  Sector  X  has only two inputs, so if one input 
price rises then the other must fall for those firms to break even, with no change 
in output price.  Yet, this does not imply that owners of one factor will gain and 
owners of the other will lose.  Rather, if  𝑤�  > 0  and  ?̂? < 0,  it means that the 
burden on capital is proportionally greater than capital’s share in national income.  
As in Harberger (1962), we assume that pollution tax revenue is used to purchase 
the two goods in the same proportion as the consumer does, so that tax revenue 
reallocation has no impact on relative prices.  
 The model’s solution for output and factor prices is presented below.3
 
?̂?𝑌 = (𝜃𝑌𝐿𝜃𝑋𝐾 − 𝜃𝑌𝐾𝜃𝑋𝐿)𝐷 [𝐴(𝑒𝑍𝑍 − 𝑒𝐾𝑍) − 𝐵(𝑒𝑍𝑍 − 𝑒𝐿𝑍) + (𝛾𝐾 − 𝛾𝐿)𝜎𝑢]?̂?𝑍+ 𝜃𝑌𝑍?̂?𝑍 
𝑤� = 𝜃𝑋𝐾𝜃𝑌𝑍
𝐷
[𝐴(𝑒𝑍𝑍 − 𝑒𝐾𝑍) − 𝐵(𝑒𝑍𝑍 − 𝑒𝐿𝑍) + (𝛾𝐾 − 𝛾𝐿)𝜎𝑢]?̂?𝑍 
?̂? = 𝜃𝑋𝐿𝜃𝑌𝑍
𝐷
[𝐴(𝑒𝐾𝑍 − 𝑒𝑍𝑍) − 𝐵(𝑒𝐿𝑍 − 𝑒𝑍𝑍) − (𝛾𝐾 − 𝛾𝐿)𝜎𝑢]?̂?𝑍 
  See 
our earlier paper for the steps to derive this solution (Fullerton and Heutel 2007). 
These equations use additional definitions for convenience.  Let  γK ≡ λKY/λKX = 
KY/KX  and  γL ≡ λLY/λLX = LY/LX,  A ≡ γKγL + γLθYK + γK(θYL + θYZ),  B ≡ γKγL + γKθYL 
                                                          
3 We omit expressions for the remaining seven endogenous variables, including the change in 
pollution (?̂?), since our focus here is on incidence through price changes. 
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+ γL(θYK + θYZ),  and  D ≡ (θXKγK + θXLγL + 1)σX + A[θXKθYL(eKL–eLZ)–θXLθYK(eKK–
eKZ)] – B[θXKθYL(eLL–eLZ)–θXLθYK(eKL–eKZ)] – (γK – γL)σu(θXKθYL – θXLθYK). 
 We briefly identify and interpret the effects present in these rather 
complex equations.  In the equations for the factor price changes,  𝑤�   and  ?̂?,  the 
last term in the bracket,  (γK – γL)σu,  represents the “output effect.”  The 
expression  (γK – γL)  is positive whenever the dirty sector is capital-intensive.  If 
so, and assuming the denominator is positive (D > 0), then an increase in the 
pollution tax  (?̂?𝑍 > 0)  will tend through this term to decrease the return to capital  
r  relative to the wage  w.  The extent to which capital is burdened depends both 
on (γK – γL), the degree of capital intensity,  and  σu,  the consumer’s ability to 
substitute away from the taxed sector’s output. 
 The first two terms in the bracket of these equations represent 
“substitution effects.”  The signs of these terms depend on the values of the Allen 
elasticities  eij.  In the case of equal factor intensities where the output effect 
disappears, it can be shown that the substitution effect burdens capital more than 
it burdens labor whenever  eLZ > eKZ,  that is, whenever labor is a better substitute 
for pollution than is capital.  When the price of emissions rises, and a firm wants 
to reduce emissions, it may do so and retain the same output level by altering its 
labor and capital inputs.  If it increases labor more than it increases capital, then 
we say that labor is a better substitute for pollution than is capital.  For example, a 
firm may switch from operating capital machinery that creates pollution and 
toward using more relatively clean labor inputs. 
 In the case with equal factor intensities (γK = γL) and equal cross-price 
terms (eLZ = eKZ), it can further be shown that  𝑤�  = ?̂? = 0.  In this knife’s edge 
case, the sources side can be ignored (as in Burtraw et al. 2009, or Hassett et al. 
2009).  We look below at actual parameters where the sources side effects may 
offset or exacerbate regressive effects on the uses side. 
 In the equation for  ?̂?𝑌,  the final term is  𝜃𝑌𝑍?̂?𝑍.  This term represents a 
“direct” effect from an increased pollution tax: the increased cost of the pollution 
input is passed into the output price in proportion to pollution’s share in 
production,  θYZ.  The rest of the expression represents all of the general 
equilibrium effects, or “indirect” effects, which include output and substitution 
effects described above.4
II. Calibration 
 
We now calibrate this model to the US economy in a way that allows us to 
consider a tax on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.  Our model only has two 
                                                          
4 The incidence of this tax in this model includes the efficiency cost of tax-induced changes in 
consumption bundles, but not the efficiency cost of tax distortions in factor markets, since total 
factor supplies are fixed.   
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sectors, so we must decide which industries of the economy are aggregated under 
the dirty sector and which under the clean sector.  Because CO2 is emitted in the 
generation of electricity, an intermediate input used by all industries, no output is 
completely “clean” as is output  X  in this model.  Instead, we choose to label as 
dirty industries those that emit the most CO2 relative to their output. 
 For information on factor intensities by industry we use data from 
Jorgenson et al. (2008).5  These data divide the US economy into 35 sectors 
(roughly corresponding to two-digit SIC codes).  They present the value of capital 
and labor inputs for each sector through 2006.  Most CO2 emissions come from 
three industries: electricity generation (38.7%), transportation (30.6%), and 
manufacturing (23.3%).6  Of manufacturing industries, the highest emitter of CO2 
is petroleum refining, both absolutely and as a fraction of the value of output.7
 These definitions give us total factor inputs of labor and capital in the 
clean and dirty sectors.  One more datum is needed to determine the factor 
intensity parameters, and that is  θYZ, the share of sector  Y’s  output that derives 
from pollution.  Since polluting industries do not pay an explicit price for CO2 
emissions, this parameter cannot be calibrated from data.  Instead, we perform a 
back-of-the-envelope calculation based on estimates of the optimal price on CO2 
from prior papers.  A price of $15 per metric ton of CO2 is often recommended, 
and we use this price as a starting point (Hassett et al. 2009).  The value of  θYZ  is 
0.0723, based on this price and our definition of the dirty sector of the economy.
  
We use our data to isolate petroleum refining, along with electricity and 
transportation.  We include these in the dirty sector, and all remaining industries 
are aggregated to the clean sector. 
8
 That calibration and the data from Jorgenson et al. (2008) jointly 
determine the factor intensity parameters shown in Table 1.  Without loss of 
generality we define a unit of each good as the amount that sells for $1 in the 
 
                                                          
5 Available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/.  
6 See http://www.epa.gov/climate/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/ExecutiveSummary.pdf, 
Table ES-2. 
7See http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/industry_mecs.pdf, Table 1. Petroleum refineries 
emitted 277.6 million metric tons of CO2 in 2005; the next highest manufacturing industry group 
was iron and steel mills with 126.0 million metric tons.  As a fraction of output, the petroleum 
industry’s emissions are 30% higher than the next highest industry (primary metals). 
8 Total U.S. GNP in 2008 is $14.3 trillion.  Our definition of the dirty sector accounts for 6.7% of 
total factor income, or $0.954 trillion.  Annual carbon dioxide emissions from the dirty sector total 
4.589 billion metric tons.  At $15 per metric ton, the value of these carbon emissions is $68.8 
billion, or 7.23% of the value of the dirty sector.  This calculation combines current emissions 
with the $15/ton price, and so it may overstate the initial level of spending on emissions, but we 
don’t observe actual emissions with that tax.  Instead we use this hypothetical initial equilibrium 
as a starting point from which to calculate the effects of a small change in tax.  
6
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initial equilibrium.  The total factor income of the economy (𝐾 + 𝐿)  is also 
normalized to one.  Using these parameters, the clean sector represents about 93% 
of factor income of the economy.  The dirty sector is relatively capital-intensive.  
Labor accounts for about 61% of total factor income. 
 
Table 1:  Base Case Factor Intensity Parameters 
KY = 0.0375 LY = 0.0291 
KX = 0.3515 LX = 0.5819 
λKY = 0.0963 λLY = 0.0477 
λKX = 0.9037 λLX = 0.9523 
θYK = 0.5220 θYL = 0.4057 
θXK = 0.3765 θXL = 0.6235 
θYZ = 0.0723  
  
The elasticity of substitution in production for the clean sector,  σX,  is set 
to one.  This value is consistent with estimates of the economy-wide elasticity, 
and since the clean sector is 93% of the economy, it is a decent approximation of 
the elasticity we seek.  In the “base case”, we also set the elasticity of substitution 
in consumption,  σu,  to one.9
 The last set of parameters needed are the Allen elasticities of substitution 
in production for the dirty sector,  eij.  Only three of these can be set 
independently; the rest are determined by these three values and the factor 
intensities, using equations from Allen (1938).  We use estimates of a translog 
KLEM model of a 35 sector US economy from Jin and Jorgenson (2010) to 
calculate these elasticities.
   
10  From this, we find  eKL = 0.1,  eKZ = 0.2,  and  eLZ =  
–0.1.  These suggest that capital is a slightly better substitute for pollution than is 
labor.  We use these values in our base case, and we vary them to test the 
sensitivity of results.11
 Our aggregated model gives us the change in input and output prices for 
any given policy change.  We want to translate those aggregate price changes into 
effects on real people, to calculate the uses- and sources-side incidence of the 
policy.  To do so, we gather data on the expenditure and income of households 
 
                                                          
9 We can show that the price elasticity of demand for the dirty good is –[α+σu(1–α)],  where  α  is 
its expenditure share.  With our base case  σu = 1,  this elasticity is –1.  We vary this parameter in 
sensitivity analysis. 
10 To get a single set of parameters, we weight the estimated elasticities across the three dirty 
industries by the value of total output in each (electricity, transportation, and petroleum refining).  
11 For comparison, de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) review data from Western European countries 
and find  eKL = 0.5, eKZ = 0.5, and eLZ = 0.3.  Their elasticities are all higher than the ones 
calculated from Jin and Jorgenson (2010), but both sets of elasticities find that capital is a better 
substitute for pollution than is labor.  
7
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with various demographic characteristics.  For example, we divide all households 
into ten deciles by annual income.  For each decile, we calculate the fraction of 
income spent on clean vs. dirty goods, and we calculate the fraction of income 
from capital vs. labor.  We can then quantify the burden of this policy change on 
each group.  A potential inconsistency is that we use a model with a 
representative consumer to get price changes and then use those price changes to 
explore implications of consumer heterogeneity in expenditure and income 
patterns.  The required assumption is that the overall effect on factor and output 
prices with heterogeneous consumers is the same as in the aggregate model.       
 We use expenditure and income data from the 2008 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) and the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).12
 To supplement these capital income data we use the SCF, which provides 
much more complete capital income data (but no expenditure data, as in the 
CEX).
  
The CEX data come from a representative sample of the U.S. population; the SCF 
oversamples rich households but includes sampling weights.  These micro-level 
data provide much information on expenditures and income sources.  We can 
define groups numerous ways, such as by annual income, race, and region of 
residence.  For each group (say, the lowest income decile), we calculate from the 
CEX the annual average expenditure on fairly detailed categories, including foods 
of various types (beef, pork, etc.), housing (mortgage interest, property tax, rent, 
etc.), and clothing (mens, womens, footwear, etc.).  The CEX provides 
information on the distribution of income sources, including income from wages 
and salaries, self-employment, and interest, dividends, rental income, and other 
property income.  Yet the CEX’s income data are limited, especially on capital 
income.  In particular, capital gains are omitted.  When aggregating total capital 
and wage income reported in the CEX, we find that capital income is less than 5% 
of total factor income, which indicates that much capital income is missing. 
13
                                                          
12 The CEX is available at 
  We impute capital income for each household in the CEX based on the 
distribution of capital income in both data sets.  For instance, for the household in 
the 75th percentile of the capital income distribution in the CEX (with a reported 
capital income of about $230), we assign the value of capital income at the 75th 
percentile of the distribution in the SCF (about $2000).  In effect, we assume that 
the underreporting of income in the CEX, though it gets the value of capital 
income wrong, preserves the household’s place in the capital income distribution.      
http://www.bls.gov/cex/, and the SCF is available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html.  
13 We drop households in the CEX with negative reported total income (1.6% of observations). 
We drop those in the SCF with negative reported capital income (2.5% of those observations).  
The mean value of reported capital gains income in the SCF is $5358, while this category is 
missing in the CEX.  The mean value of business income (including farms) in the SCF is $11316, 
while it is only $3252 in the CEX.  Our use of the SCF resembles that of Metcalf et al. (2010). 
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 Table 2 summarizes the distribution of income and expenditures by annual 
income decile.  Columns two through four present the distribution of income 
between wage, capital, and transfer income.  Wage and salary income are directly 
reported in the CEX.  Capital income from the SCF is the sum of income from 
interest, dividends, capital gains, and farm and other business income (but not any 
capital income within retirement accounts).14
 
  Wage and capital income sum to 
less than 100% because of transfer income sources: Social Security, 
unemployment and workers’ compensation, and other public assistance.  We omit 
the category “other income,” which accounts for less than 1% of total income. 
Table 2: Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Income Group 
(1) 
Annual 
Income 
Decile 
(2) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Wages 
(3) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Capital 
(4) 
% of 
Income 
from 
Transfers 
(5) 
Capital-
Wage 
Ratio  
(%) 
(6) 
Dirty Good 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Income 
(7) 
Clean Good 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Income 
All 69.1 24.6 6.3 35.6 6.6 58.7 
1 35.8 5.7 58.5 16.0 47.4 361.0 
2 33.9 4.1 62.1 12.0 20.3 141.9 
3 55.1 6.5 38.4 11.8 16.7 116.5 
4 68.1 7.4 24.5 10.9 13.5 97.3 
5 79.9 7.8 12.2 9.8 11.1 84.0 
6 83.4 8.8 7.8 10.6 9.6 74.8 
7 86.6 9.1 4.3 10.5 8.3 68.0 
8 86.8 10.6 2.6 12.2 7.2 62.9 
9 84.9 13.2 1.9 15.6 5.9 58.1 
10 53.5 45.6 0.9 85.3 2.5 32.6 
   
 Overall, about 69% of consumer income is from wages, 25% from capital, 
and 6% from transfers.  These fractions vary by income group.  The fraction of 
income coming from transfers is declining over income deciles (with the 
exception that the lowest income decile has a slightly lower fraction than the next 
decile), and the fraction of income coming from capital is increasing (with the 
same lone exception).  Column 5 presents the capital-wage income ratio for each 
group, excluding any income from transfers.  This ratio is U-shaped, with a much 
higher value for the richest decile.   
The fact that the lowest annual income decile has the second-highest 
capital-wage ratio (16%) indicates one major problem with using annual income 
to categorize families from rich to poor.  The lowest decile includes a lot of 
                                                          
14 The omission of capital income from retirement accounts understates total capital income.  
While the SCF includes retirement account withdrawals and balances, it does not show income. 
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retired individuals who have no labor income and are living off their retirement 
savings.  These individuals may not really be “poor” on a lifetime basis.  In other 
words, though we may want to classify households by the stock of lifetime 
wealth, we instead are classifying them by a flow of annual income.  If individuals 
smooth consumption over their lifetime, as pointed out by Poterba (1989), then 
total annual consumption might be a good proxy for lifetime income (or at least, a 
better proxy than is annual income).  We investigate this alternative below. 
 The final two columns in Table 2 present a distribution of expenditures 
between the clean and dirty outputs.15   Each value is a ratio of that expenditure to 
annual income, not to total expenditures, so these two values do not add to 100% 
in each row.  The poorest deciles spend more than they earn, and the richest 
deciles spend less than they earn.16
Our earlier distinction between clean and dirty production sectors does not 
present us with an immediate mapping into clean and dirty consumption goods.  
Some of the outputs of the industries defined as dirty are used as inputs to 
industries defined as clean.  A complete analysis would account for these inputs, 
for example by using Input-Output matrices as in Hassett et al. (2009).  Here, we 
simply assign final consumption goods into either a clean or dirty category.  Four 
categories of expenditures (out of the 74 total) are labeled as dirty: electricity, 
natural gas, fuel oil and other fuels, and gasoline.  These are the goods whose 
consumption directly involves the combustion of fossil fuels (save for electricity, 
some of which is generated by nuclear or renewable sources).  This choice is 
justified by a more complete analysis considering the pass-through of costs 
through intermediate goods (Hassett et al. 2009).  For a CO2 tax of $15 per metric 
ton, they find that the prices of these four categories of goods increase by 8-13%, 
while no other category of goods sees a price increase of greater than 1%.
  
17
 Overall, in Table 2, about 7% of income goes toward these dirty goods, 
and about nine times as much goes toward clean goods.  The pattern of 
expenditures for these annual income groups is smoother than is the pattern for 
 
                                                          
15 Only 65.3% of total income is spent (see the top row of Table 2).  This ratio is low, compared to 
the 85% ratio in data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=Y 
(see Table 2.1).  Using the CEX data alone, however, the overall ratio of expenditure to income is 
only 78.7%.  We then add some imputed capital income from the SCF, which reduces the overall 
spending/income ratio from 78.7% to 65.3%.     
16 One reasonable approach would scale all household expenditures upward so that their sum is 
85% of income as in the NIPA accounts, but we wish to avoid unnecessary manipulation of the 
data.  A proportional scaling would not change our relative burden results in any case. 
17 The exception is air transportation, whose price increases by 1.86%.  The CEX tables do not list 
expenditures on air transportation separately (they are lumped with public transportation). 
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income sources.  Higher income households spend a lower fraction of their total 
income on dirty goods than do lower income households.   
  
Table 3: Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Expenditure Group 
(1) 
Expend. 
Decile 
(2) 
Wage 
Income as 
% of 
Expend. 
(3) 
Capital 
Income as 
% of 
Expend. 
(4) 
Transfer 
Income as 
% of 
Expend. 
(5) 
Capital-
Wage 
Ratio  
(%) 
(6) 
% of 
Expend. 
on Dirty 
Good 
(7) 
% of 
Expend. 
on Clean 
Good 
All 105.8 37.6 9.7 35.6 10.1 89.9 
1 42.8 13.5 63.5 31.6 14.5 85.5 
2 74.5 13.8 36.6 18.5 15.2 84.8 
3 86.3 16.2 26.8 18.7 14.6 85.4 
4 103.5 18.0 17.7 17.4 13.9 86.1 
5 108.8 20.4 13.8 18.7 13.2 86.8 
6 114.4 29.4 10.0 25.7 12.3 87.7 
7 118.8 31.2 7.3 26.2 11.5 88.5 
8 120.0 38.4 5.7 32.0 10.8 89.2 
9 124.6 45.1 3.9 36.2 9.3 90.7 
10 93.4 54.7 2.4 58.6 5.9 94.1 
 
Because of the issues discussed earlier with measuring incidence across 
annual income groups, Table 3 presents the same decompositions across deciles 
defined by a different measure of “income”, namely total annual expenditure 
(which serves as a proxy for lifetime income).  Yet we do not have lifetime 
breakdowns of wages and capital income.  Therefore, in Table 3, all annual 
income sources do not sum to this measure of income, while all annual 
expenditures do sum to this measure of income.  On average, the sum of all 
sources of annual income is higher than total annual expenditure.  In Table 3, the 
pattern of spending across clean and dirty goods is qualitatively the same as in 
Table 2; richer households have a lower ratio for expenditures on dirty goods.  In 
fact, using consumption deciles rather than annual income decile reduces the 
variance in the fraction spent on the dirty good.  The gap between the richest and 
poorest groups’ percentage spent on the dirty good is 9 percentage points in Table 
3, versus 45 percentage points in Table 2.    
 The implications of this phenomenon will be seen below in the simulation 
results.  Briefly, when a CO2 tax hike increases the relative price of the dirty 
good, then the tax hike appears less regressive when households are divided into 
annual consumption groups than when households are divided into annual income 
groups.  This corroborates previous research on the uses-side incidence of energy 
policy (Hassett et al. 2009) and more generally of consumption taxes (Lyon and 
Schwab 1995). 
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Capital income's share is monotonically increasing across the expenditure 
deciles, and transfer income’s share declines across the expenditure deciles.  The 
capital-wage ratio is high for the poorest group compared to the second group, but 
then shows a roughly increasing pattern through the remaining nine deciles.  For 
all groups, the sum of annual income sources exceeds total spending.    
III. Numerical Results 
We consider the effects of doubling the CO2 tax from $15 to $30 per ton, that is, a 
100% increase in the tax rate  (?̂?𝑍 = 1).  The base case results for changes in goods 
prices and factor prices are presented in the first column of Table 4.  Other 
columns present results from sensitivity analyses, discussed later.  In all columns 
the price of the dirty good changes by more than 7%, while factor prices change 
by less than one percent.  But these results do not imply that effects on the uses 
side outweigh effects on the sources side, because the 7% output price change 
applies to only the 6.6% of income spent on the dirty good, while a “small” factor 
price change may apply to more than half of a group’s income.  Later we will see 
that uses effects usually outweigh sources effects, but not always. 
 
Table 4: Simulation Results: Effect on Factor and Output Prices (%) 
 
 
Change in  
Price of: 
(1) 
Base 
Case 
(2) 
Capital a 
Better 
Substitute 
(3) 
Labor a 
Better 
Substitute 
(4) 
Low 
Substitution 
in Utility 
(5) 
High 
Substitution 
in Utility 
Dirty good, ?̂?𝑌 7.20 7.26 7.07 7.23 7.16 
Wage rate, 𝑤�  0.0718 –0.067 0.35 0.00100 0.14 
Return, ?̂? –0.12 0.11 –0.58 –0.00166 –0.24 
 
 In the base case, the change in the relative output price  ?̂?𝑌  (0.0720) is 
very close to  θYZ?̂?𝑍 (0.0723, see Table 1),  which we called the “direct” effect 
from passing through the tax increase.  The relative changes in the wage and the 
capital rental rate are small, but we expect them to be small.  They come from 
doubling the price of an input that represents 7% of a sector, which itself 
comprises about 7% of the economy.  The change in the capital rental rate  ?̂?  is 
negative, and the change in the wage  𝑤�   is positive, so capital bears a higher than 
proportional share of the burden of the tax increase.  Using our base case 
parameters, capital is a better substitute for pollution than is labor (eKZ > eLZ), so 
the substitution effect pushes more of the burden onto labor.  However, the dirty 
sector is capital-intensive, so the output effect pushes more of the burden on 
capital.  Here, the output effect dominates the substitution effect. 
 We then use Table 2 to translate these price changes into relative uses-side 
and sources-side burdens for different annual income groups.  For each income 
group, we first calculate  ?̂?𝑌  times expenditures on the dirty good, plus  ?̂?𝑋  times 
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expenditures spent on the clean good (all divided by the group’s income).  
Because our numeraire used in solving the system sets  ?̂?𝑋 = 0, these burdens will 
be positive for every group.  Yet none of these results should imply anything 
about how much of the burden is on the uses side compared to the sources side; 
that comparison depends entirely on the choice of numeraire (or equivalently, on 
whether monetary policy accommodates the increase in output prices or forces the 
burden to be felt by falling factor prices).  Since the choice of numeraire does not 
affect the real incidence of a tax, the discussion of burdens on the uses side should 
focus only on who spends relatively more on each good (not on how much of the 
burden is on the uses side).  Similarly, the discussion of sources side should focus 
only on who earns relatively more from each factor.  
For this reason, we normalize the calculated uses side burden for each 
group by subtracting from it a uses side calculation based on the entire sample.  
Those groups with a positive value see the ratio of their expenditures to income 
increase more than the average, and those groups with a negative value see their 
ratio of expenditures to income increase less than the average.  The calculation is 
similar for the sources-side incidence:  𝑤�   times income from wages plus  ?̂?  times 
income from capital, all divided by total income, minus this ratio for the entire 
sample.  Using this procedure, results do not depend on the choice of numeraire.  
We change the sign of the sources side calculation, however, so that those income 
groups whose income decreases more than the average have a positive “burden”, 
while those groups whose income decreases less than the average have a negative 
burden (a relative gain).  Finally, we calculate each group’s normalized overall 
burden by summing the uses side and sources side burdens.   
 
Table 5: Incidence with Base Case Parameters for Annual Income Deciles 
Annual Income 
Decile 
Relative Burden from 
Output Price Changes 
(%) 
Relative Burden from 
Factor Price Changes  
(%) 
Relative Overall 
Burden (%) 
1 2.936 0.001 2.937 
2 0.986 0.001 0.986 
3 0.724 -0.012 0.713 
4 0.496 -0.020 0.476 
5 0.323 -0.028 0.295 
6 0.216 -0.029 0.186 
7 0.123 -0.031 0.092 
8 0.045 -0.029 0.015 
9 -0.051 -0.025 -0.076 
10 -0.297 0.036 -0.261 
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These incidence results are presented in Table 5.  The pattern of uses-side 
burdens in the first column is clear: the highest income groups (deciles 9 and 10) 
suffer a smaller than average share of this burden.  Their cost of goods decreases 
relative to the average, because they spend a lower than average fraction on the 
dirty good.  With our choice of numeraire, the average increase in overall price is 
about 0.48% (a 7.2% increase in the price of the good that constitutes 6.6% of 
total annual income).  Thus, Table 5 tells us that the highest income group’s price 
increase under this normalization overall is only about 0.18%, whereas the lowest 
income group sees an overall price increase of about 3.4%.  These results are 
consistent with those in Hassett et al. (2009), who examine the uses-side 
incidence of a CO2 tax.  They find that the relative burden is monotonically 
decreasing across the income deciles.  Burtraw et al. (2009) find the same result 
of uses side regressivity for a cap-and-trade policy. 
The sources-side burden in the second column of Table 5 is felt most by 
the highest and lowest income deciles; the positive burdens for the lowest deciles 
indicate that their incomes fall proportionally more than average.  In the base case 
simulation,   𝑤�  > 0  and  ?̂? < 0,  so earning a higher fraction of income from 
capital tends to increase overall real burdens.  Table 2 shows that the capital-wage 
income ratio is U-shaped across the ten deciles, and so the sources side burden in 
Table 5 is U-shaped.  This effect is muted in the lowest decile, however, because 
of their high share of income from transfers.  Because the sources side burdens 
are all small relative to the uses side burdens, the overall pattern in the last 
column mimics the regressive burdens on the uses side. 
 
Table 6: Incidence with Base Case Parameters for Expenditure Deciles 
Annual Expenditure 
Decile 
Relative Burden from 
Output Price Changes 
(%) 
Relative Burden from 
Factor Price Changes 
(%) 
Relative 
Overall Burden 
(%) 
1 0.316 0.016 0.333 
2 0.366 -0.006 0.360 
3 0.319 -0.012 0.307 
4 0.273 -0.022 0.251 
5 0.218 -0.023 0.195 
6 0.157 -0.016 0.141 
7 0.099 -0.017 0.082 
8 0.046 -0.009 0.036 
9 -0.063 -0.005 -0.068 
10 -0.303 0.029 -0.273 
 
Table 6 presents the same calculations for income groups defined by 
annual consumption rather than by annual income.  The uses-side incidence in the 
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first column is again regressive, and the sources-side incidence in the second 
column is again U-shaped.  And because the uses side burden again dominates the 
sources side, the overall burden is still regressive.  When groups are defined by 
annual consumption, the uses-side incidence is less regressive than when defined 
by annual income.  The lowest expenditure decile’s relative price increase in 
Table 6 (0.32%) is smaller than the lowest annual income decile’s price increase 
in Table 5 (2.94%).  This pattern can be seen in Figure 1, which plots the relative 
uses-side burdens by income and expenditure deciles.  This result occurs because 
the between-decile variance in the fraction of spending on the dirty good is lower 
across consumption deciles than across annual income deciles.   
 
 
 
Sources-side incidence is U-shaped in Table 6 due to the U-shaped pattern 
of capital-wage income ratios in Table 3, because the wage is rising (𝑤�  = 
+0.07%), while the return to capital is falling  (?̂? = –0.12%).  Both sets of relative 
sources-side burdens are plotted in Figure 2. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 The results in Tables 5-6 are calculated using our base case parameter 
values.  Some of these parameters are based on solid information about factor 
shares or consumption shares, but some of the parameters are known with little 
precision.  Thus, sensitivity analysis is in order.  In particular, the elasticities of 
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile
Figure 1: Base-Case Relative Burdens on the Uses Side
By annual income decile
By annual expenditure 
decile
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substitution in production for the dirty sector have not been directly estimated.18
 
 
  
Next, we present alternative incidence calculations for different sets of parameter 
values.  The changes in prices under these alternative parameter values are 
presented in columns 2 through 5 of Table 4.  In columns 2 and 3, all of the 
parameters are identical to their base case values except for the dirty sector 
substitution elasticities.    In column 2, we set  eKL = 0.1,  eKZ = 0.5,  and  eLZ =     
–0.5.  In this column, capital is a much better substitute for pollution than is labor; 
in fact, labor is a complement for pollution rather than a substitute.  As we expect, 
under these parameters, labor ends up relatively worse off with a pollution tax 
increase.  The signs of the price changes in   w  and  r  switch from the base case.  
The second set of results (in column 3) are based on parameters where labor is a 
much better substitute for pollution than is capital:  eKL = 0.1,  eKZ = –0.5,  and  eLZ 
= 0.5.  Under these parameter values, capital bears a larger share of the tax burden 
than even in the base case, since the fact that labor is a substitute for pollution 
enables it to avoid more of the burden.   
 
Table 7 presents the resulting incidence calculations across annual 
expenditure groups.  Columns 2 and 3 present the relative burdens from the uses 
                                                          
18 We calibrated elasticities for our model based on estimates in Jin and Jorgenson (2010) that 
were based on a somewhat different model, with more sectors, and where firms use labor, capital, 
and energy.  Our dirty sector uses labor, capital, and pollution (which is not the same as energy, 
because firms can reduce their pollution per unit of energy).  
-0.04%
-0.03%
-0.02%
-0.01%
0.00%
0.01%
0.02%
0.03%
0.04%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile
Figure 2: Base-Case Relative Burdens on the Sources Side
By annual income decile
By annual expenditure 
decile
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side and sources side for the first set of alternative parameter values, where capital 
is a better substitute for pollution than is labor.  The uses-side incidence results 
are not affected very much (relative to Table 6), even with this large change of 
production substitution elasticities.  The households with the lowest expenditures 
tend to see higher than average increases in their costs, indicating a regressive 
uses-side incidence.  However, under these parameter values the sources-side 
incidence results are starkly different from the U-shaped burdens associated with 
the base case parameters in Table 6 (where the reduction in  r  hurts capital 
owners in the highest and lowest income deciles).  In column 3 of Table 7, the 
return to capital rises (as shown in column 2 of Table 4), so the richest and 
poorest deciles see their incomes rise relative to the average, while the middle 
deciles see their incomes fall relative to the average.  Under these parameters, 
capital is a better substitute for pollution than is labor, so the pollution tax 
increase means that labor is made relatively worse off.  The highest annual 
expenditure group has the highest capital/wage income ratio, and thus it gains the 
most on the sources side under this parameterization.  Here, instead of offsetting 
the uses side, the sources side exacerbates the regressivity of the uses side. 
 
Table 7: Incidence for Expenditure Deciles, 
Sensitivity Analysis on Production Parameters 
 Capital a better substitute for 
pollution 
Labor a better substitute for 
pollution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Annual 
Expenditure 
Decile 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
1 0.319 -0.016 0.311 0.081 
2 0.369 0.005 0.360 -0.029 
3 0.321 0.011 0.313 -0.056 
4 0.276 0.020 0.268 -0.106 
5 0.220 0.021 0.214 -0.111 
6 0.158 0.015 0.154 -0.078 
7 0.099 0.016 0.097 -0.083 
8 0.046 0.009 0.045 -0.045 
9 -0.064 0.004 -0.062 -0.023 
10 -0.305 -0.027 -0.297 0.143 
 
Columns 4 and 5 present incidence calculations under the parameter 
values that make labor a much better substitute for pollution than capital.  Again, 
the uses-side incidence results are virtually no different than in the base case; the 
burden is regressive.  However, the sources-side incidence results in column 5 are 
opposite to those in column 3 and are in the same direction as in the base case.  
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  Here, because the wage rate rises, the poorest and richest deciles have more 
burden relative to the average, and the middle deciles have less burden relative to 
the average.  The highest income group has the most capital and is therefore 
burdened the most,  so the sources-side incidence is more progressive than in the 
base case results.  The degree of progressivity is higher than in the base case, 
since the magnitudes of the factor price changes are higher in this simulation than 
in the base case. 
An additional sensitivity analysis we perform involves varying the 
elasticity of substitution in utility,  σu.  In the base case this value is one.  The 
analytical solutions of the model show that the value of this parameter affects the 
strength of the output effect.  As with the elasticities of substitution in production 
for the dirty sector, the true value of this parameter is not known.  We choose two 
alternate values for  σu:  0.5 and 1.5.  These results are presented in columns 4 and 
5 of Table 4.  The substitution elasticities in production are kept at the base case 
values.  When  σu = 0.5,  the relative price changes in  w  and  r  are very close to 
zero, indicating a proportionally-shared burden between labor and capital.  When  
σu = 1.5,  capital bears a higher share of the burden than in the base case.  In all of 
these cases the dirty sector is capital-intensive, and so the output effect makes 
capital worse off.  When  σu = 0.5,  the output effect burden on capital is small 
and completely offset by the substitution effect (which helps capital, since  eKZ > 
eLZ).  When  σu = 1.5,  the output effect is large and dominates the substitution 
effect, so capital bears relatively more of the burden of the CO2 tax increase.  The 
uses-side incidence  ?̂?𝑌  does not vary much with  σu. 
Table 8 presents incidence calculations for the alternative parameter 
values of  σu.  This parameter does not affect the uses-side incidence, which is 
regressive for both alternate values of  σu.  It does, however, affect the sources-
side incidence.  When  σu  is low, as in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, the output 
effect hurting capital is small and dominated by the substitution effect, so the 
burden on capital is roughly proportional (to three decimal places).  On the other 
hand, when  σu  is high, the burden on capital owners is increased since the output 
effect dominates.  Thus, the richest and poorest households bear relatively more 
of the burden.19
Middle-Aged Heads of Household 
   
 Annual income is a poor proxy for lifetime income.  Annual consumption 
may be a better proxy, but even this case leaves us with only one year’s capital-
wage income ratio.  This measure may fail to capture the desired long-term 
capital-wage income ratio for each permanent income group.  A large part of the 
                                                          
19 All of the findings from Table 7 and 8 hold for annual income deciles as well as annual 
expenditure deciles, though those results are not presented.   
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problem is that individuals have different income patterns at different stages of 
their lives.  Retirees have low annual income but high a capital share, while 
college students have low annual income but high borrowing.  Some evidence for 
this pattern appears in the CEX data.  The ten annual income deciles have average 
ages that range from 45.3 years to 58.9 years, whereas the ten annual consumption 
deciles have average ages that range only from 47.2 years to 53.1 years. 
 
Table 8: Incidence for Expenditure Deciles, 
Sensitivity Analysis on Substitution in Utility 
 Low substitution in utility High substitution in utility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Annual 
Expenditure 
Decile 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
1 0.318 0.000 0.315 0.030 
2 0.368 0.000 0.364 -0.013 
3 0.320 0.000 0.317 -0.024 
4 0.274 0.000 0.272 -0.044 
5 0.219 0.000 0.217 -0.046 
6 0.158 0.000 0.156 -0.032 
7 0.099 0.000 0.098 -0.034 
8 0.046 0.000 0.045 -0.018 
9 -0.063 0.000 -0.063 -0.009 
10 -0.304 0.000 -0.301 0.058 
 
An alternative method of overcoming this life-cycle problem is to focus on 
only one age group for head of household.  We choose households whose heads 
are 41-50 years old.20
The big difference in Table 9 compared to Table 3 is that the capital-wage 
income ratio is clearly rising with income (in an almost monotonic fashion).  In 
  Table 9 summarizes the income sources and expenditure 
data across the ten annual expenditure deciles of these households.  Overall, these 
households have a lower capital-wage ratio (25.1%) than do all households 
(35.6%, in Table 3).  The fraction of expenditures on dirty goods (10.2%) is 
virtually identical to that for all households (10.1%, Table 3).  Across expenditure 
deciles, the decreasing fraction of income from transfers is again seen.  Here, 
though, this fraction drops to single-digit percentages by the second decile, and 
overall, transfers are only 2.6% rather than 9.7% of expenditure (Table 3).  These 
41-50 year old household heads are not receiving nearly as much Social Security 
retirement income as all other households in Table 3.   
                                                          
20 Another approach, which we do not pursue here, is to attempt to create a synthetic cohort of 
households using multiple years of the CEX, as in Jorgenson and Slesnick (2008). 
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Table 3, it was U-shaped.  While using expenditure deciles in Table 3 may 
capture permanent income, each decile still contains young and old with very 
different income sources.  The 41-50 year olds in Table 9 may have income 
sources that better reflect their long run income sources. 
 
Table 9: Sources and Uses of Income for each Annual Expenditure Group, 
Households with Heads aged 41-50 only 
(1) 
Annual 
Expend. 
Decile 
(2) 
Wage 
Income as 
% of 
Expend. 
(3) 
Capital 
Income as 
% of 
Expend. 
(4) 
Transfer 
Income as 
% of 
Expend. 
(5) 
Capital-
Wage 
Ratio (%) 
(6) 
% of 
Expend. 
on Dirty 
Good 
(7) 
% of 
Expend. 
on Clean 
Good 
All 125.5 31.5 2.6 25.1 10.2 89.8 
1 94.9 7.7 26.7 8.1 15.2 84.8 
2 125.2 11.3 9.9 9.0 15.4 84.6 
3 131.8 12.6 8.0 9.6 14.6 85.4 
4 137.2 22.3 3.3 16.2 14.0 86.0 
5 141.3 16.9 2.5 12.0 13.2 86.8 
6 140.3 29.7 2.0 21.2 12.1 87.9 
7 133.1 35.4 1.5 26.6 11.7 88.3 
8 142.7 34.2 1.4 23.9 10.8 89.2 
9 131.4 31.3 0.8 23.8 8.9 91.1 
10 101.5 44.3 0.5 43.6 5.9 94.1 
 
Table 10 presents the incidence calculations for these 41-50 year old 
household heads.  Columns 2 and 3 present results using the base case parameters, 
columns 4 and 5 are from the alternative substitution elasticity values where 
capital is a much better substitute for pollution than is labor, and columns 6 and 7 
are from the alternative substitution elasticity values where labor is a much better 
substitute for pollution.  As before, the uses-side burden is regressive and 
consistent across parameter values.  In the base case, the sources-side incidence is 
progressive, in contrast to the U-shaped result from the base case for all 
households (Table 6).  Under the alternate substitution parameters, the sources-
side burden is regressive when capital is a better substitute for pollution, and 
progressive when labor is a better substitute for pollution.   
Whereas the capital-wage ratio for all households in Table 3 varies from 
0.185 to 0.586 (a factor of three), the ratio for 41-50 year olds in Table 9 varies 
from 0.081 to 0.436 (a factor of more than five).  If capital income is an important 
lifetime source of income for the well-to-do, and if the return falls as much as 
0.58% (column 3 of Table 4 and last column of Table 10), then the sources side 
could be particularly progressive.  In fact, the sources-side burden here is 
sufficiently progressive that it comes close to offsetting the regressivity of the 
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uses side burden: the overall burden is much less regressive than in any other 
simulation.  If the return rises 0.11% (column 2 of Table 4 and column 5 of Table 
10), then the sources side could be regressive – exacerbating the regressive effects 
of carbon pricing on the uses side.  We conclude that general equilibrium effects 
are potentially important.  
 
Table 10: Incidence for Households with Heads aged 41-50 only 
 Base Case Capital better substitute for 
pollution 
Labor better substitute for 
pollution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Annual 
Expend
Decile 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Output Price 
Burden (%) 
Relative 
Factor Price 
Burden (%) 
1 0.358 -0.007 0.361 0.006 0.351 -0.031 
2 0.374 -0.024 0.377 0.022 0.367 -0.116 
3 0.314 -0.027 0.317 0.025 0.308 -0.132 
4 0.274 -0.019 0.277 0.018 0.269 -0.094 
5 0.211 -0.029 0.213 0.027 0.207 -0.140 
6 0.135 -0.013 0.137 0.012 0.133 -0.062 
7 0.106 -0.001 0.107 0.001 0.104 -0.003 
8 0.041 -0.009 0.041 0.009 0.040 -0.045 
9 -0.098 -0.004 -0.099 0.004 -0.096 -0.022 
10 -0.312 0.033 -0.315 -0.030 -0.306 0.158 
 
Regional Incidence 
 Incidence can be defined across groups defined in ways other than annual 
income or annual expenditure.  We look also at incidence across regions.  The 
CEX data along with imputed capital income from the SCF data are used to 
tabulate expenditure and income data by the four census regions.  Results are 
summarized here.  Households in the West region have a substantially higher 
capital-wage ratio (42% vs. an average of 35.6%).  Households in the West spend 
a lower fraction of their expenditures on dirty goods (8.4%), and households in 
the South spend a higher fraction on the dirty good (11.3%), compared to the 
average (10.1%, Table 3).  A reason is that households in the South spend more 
than elsewhere on electricity for their air conditioners.  The incidence results 
follow from these facts.  On the uses side, the West faces a lower burden (0.125% 
less than average) and the South faces a higher burden (0.087% higher than 
average).  The deviations from a proportional burden on the sources side are 
small, but the West’s burden is somewhat higher than the average (0.009%). 
IV. Conclusion 
We use an analytical general equilibrium tax incidence model to examine the 
uses-side and sources-side distribution of burdens from a carbon tax.  In general, 
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who spend more than average on dirty goods (electricity, natural gas, gasoline, 
heating oil).  This reinforces previous findings that the uses-side incidence is 
regressive (Hassett et al. 2009, or Burtraw et al. 2009).  The base case results 
suggest that the sources-side costs are relatively more burdensome on those who 
earn a higher than average fraction of their income from capital (because carbon-
intensive industries tend to be relatively capital-intensive).  This implies a U-
shaped burden when households are divided by annual expenditure or by annual 
income.  This result is sensitive to chosen parameter values for substitution 
elasticities that are not known.  The burden on the sources side can even be 
regressive if the wage falls relative to the rental rate, such as when capital is better 
than labor as a substitute for pollution. 
 Many extensions to the model are possible, including more sectors, more 
final goods, intermediate goods, market power, or other refinements.21  In 
particular, consideration of imperfect factor mobility could significantly affect the 
results; the transition costs for both capital and labor are likely to be large 
components of the overall burden of any policy.  The effect of market power or 
industry regulation may be of particular relevance to a carbon tax, since electric 
utilities are large emitters and are often highly regulated.  The particular policy 
could be modeled more carefully, rather than just looking at a simple tax.22  A 
more complex CGE model may allow more specific results, but at the expense of 
analytical solutions made possible by our simple two-sector model.23  Finally, this 
model does not incorporate the benefits of pollution reduction, which themselves 
may be progressive or regressive. 
                                                          
21 Capital may bear none of the burden, for example, in a dynamic model with capital 
accumulation, or in an open economy with international mobility where the world-wide rate of 
return is fixed (though see Gravelle and Smetters, 2006). 
22 See Burtraw et al. (2010) for an analysis of how the choice of allocation of carbon permits to the 
electricity sector affects the distribution of costs across income groups and regions. 
23 For example, Rausch et al. (2010) use a CGE model with a detailed structure of the U.S. energy 
sector to investigate the distributional impacts of a carbon tax. 
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